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ABSTRACT 
Learning by doing denotes the cost reduction in production that firms achieve with their output. We 
check if the known properties of deterministic models, concerning the behaviour of the finns, hold 
under uncertainty. A discrete time and fioite horizon model is considered: a monopolist, facing a 
linear demand, maximizes the expected profit flow, with multiplicative uncertainty 00 tbe cost 
reduction and an upper bound fOf this reduction. We show analytically that sorne properties do hold 
and sorne others do oot. 
RESUMEN 
Learning by doing denota la reducción de costes de producción que las empresas logran mediante la 
experiencia. Se analiza si las propiedades conocidas para modelos determinísticos, relativas al 
comportamiento óptimo de las empresas, se mantienen bajo incertidumbre. Se considera un modelo 
en tiempo discreto y horizonte finito. Un monopolista, enfrentado a una demanda lineal, maximiza 
el flujo esperado de beneficios, con incertidumbre multiplicativa en la reducción de costes y un límite 
superior en esta reducción. Se prueba analíticamente que algunas propiedades del caso determiIÚstico 
se mantienen bajo incertidumbre y otras no. 
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1. Introduction 
The finns of sorne industries have reductions in their production cost simply because they 
accumulate experience by repiting their activity, that is, by means ofproduction. This is known as 
learning by doing and has been observed in industries which are at an early stage of their productive 
life. The first study which presents sorne empirical evidence on this effect is by Wright (1936), and 
it is referred to the aircraft industry. Others are those by Joskow (1993) and Lester (1993) for electrie 
power in nuclear plants, Dick (1991) for microconductors in Japan, or Argote et aL (1990) for the 
ship industry. 
The first work where eeonOnllC implications of learning by doing are studied is by Arrow 
(1962). Afier Arraw's wark, fuere is a wide branch otthe econamic theory literature concerning the 
behaviour of finns in an industry with leaming by doing (e.g: Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Stokey 
(1986) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988». In general, a11 of these works consider detenninistic mode1s 
and they find sorne properties of the optimal poliey of the finns. In this paper, we study if these 
properties hold when sorne uncertainty is introduced in the cost reduetion process. Uneertainty is 
introdueed in sueh a way that the resulting problem ls still a leaming by doing problem: cost 
reduction ean on1y be achieved thorough produetion. We find tbat sorne properties of the detenninistic 
problem do hold and some others do noto 
We consider a rnodel in discrete time and with finite horizan. A monopolist, facíng no entry 
and opperating in a market with a linear demand function, maximizes current and expected future 
profits (risk neutrality is assumed). We talce as starting point the deterministic cost reduction equation 
proposed by Dasgupta and Stigltiz (1988): c(t+l)=max{T,c(t)-,8q(t)}, where c(t) and q(t) are, 
respectively, the unitary cost and output in perlad t. We introduce uncertainty by letting: 
c(t+ 1)=rnax{T,c(t)-,8(t)q(t)} where {,8(t)} Is a U.d. sequence of random variables with known 
probability distribution. This is the so-called multiplicative uncertainty (e.g.: Kendrick (1981». Note 
tbat the problem with multiplicative uncertainty is strictly a learning by doing problem in the sense 
given aboye. 
We divide theJ~IYSiS in two parts. In the first part, we study how uncertainty changes the 
optimal output in a given periodo In the second part, we study if the known porperties of the optimal 
output's path of the deterministic model hold under uncertainty. Both parts are different, Le. it is a 
known property of the detenninistic model that output increases over time. Whether it holds under 
multiplicative uncertainty or not (second part) is not related to ask if, in a given period, the optima] 
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output in the detenninistic model is greater ar lower than in the stochastic model (first part). 
We present anaIytical results showing that the effect of multiplicative uncertainty on the 
optimal output of a given period depends on the initial cost of the monopolist. Furthermore, the 
known properties of the optima! output's path for the detenninistic case are: i) in every period, output 
is superior to the mlopie case (that in which only current profit is maximized); ii) output ¡nereases 
over time; iii) in sorne cases (which we determine both for the detenninistic and the stochastic case) 
the monopolist apperates at a loss. We show analytically that, under multiplicative uncertainty: i) 
holds, ii) does not hold for any set of parameters; iii) holds under similar canditions for the 
deterministic and the stochastic case. 
In the paper, Section 2 describes the rnodeL Section 3 and 4 have, respectively, the first and 
the second part of the analysis stated abOYe. Section 5 has conclusions and sorne ideas for further 
researeh. 
2. The Model 
First, we present the model in Its detenninistic version, and then we extend it to a stochastie 
case. In both problerns we take discrete time and two periods as time horizon (periods O and Ir", 
and we consider a monopolist, facing no entry. In the denninistic case, the monopolist maximizes the 
present and future discounted profits. The discount parameter is A. The demand function is linear and 
constant over time, in period t the inverse demand function is: 
p(t) = a-bq(t) t = 0,1 (1) 
where p(t) and q(t) are, respectively, the priee and the output in period t. In that period, the unitary 
cost is c(t). There are not fixed costs. So, given q(t) and c(t), the present profit in period t is 
(a-bq(t)-c(t»q(t). The change from c(O) to c(l) is given by: c(l)=max{T,c(O)-¡3q(O)}. This equation 
is proposed by Dasgupta and Stigiltz (1988). It assumes that the cost reduction is a linear function on 
the output ofthe previous period while the cost remains aboye a certain value T, and ifthe cost takes 
that value, remains in it forever. Furthermore, {3 is the cost reduction that a unit of output generates 
while 7 is not reached. Formally, the problem is: 
n We will extend tbe model to a time borizon Twhen necessary. However, we start with a two period 
model fO! simplicity and because il also allows to study sorne of the questions stated before. 
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.1 
I 
I 
Problem 1 
, 
MAl( (l:,X'(a-bq(t)-c(t))q(t)) 
'" q(O),q(l) 
subject to: 
c(1) = max{T,C(O)-~q(OJ) 
q(t)~O for every tE {O,l}. 
c{0) is given, and a,b,A,{3,T,T are known. 
Gther assumptions for the deterministic case are: 
c(0) > T 
a > c(O) 
T > O; ~ > O; b > O; X E (0,1] 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Assumption (4) establishes that in problem 1 there can be cost reduction. Assumption (5) 
ensures that output is positive in every periodo FinalIy, in (6) we assume that the lower bound on the 
cost is positive (7)0), that a raise in the output reduces the future cost ({3>O), that the demand 
function is decreasing (b>0) and that the discount factor belongs to (0,1]. 
In the stochastic case, there is multiplicative uncertainty in the cost reduction equation. More 
concretely, the change from c{O) to c(l) is given now by c(1)=rnax{7,c(0)-,8(0)q(O)}, where ,8(0) is 
a random variable with probability distriblltion: Prob(¡3(t)=¡3+0)=Prob(¡3(t)={3-0)= lh, where 13 and 
O are known. This equation is a natural extension of the deterministic version given above ... •. We 
also assume that the wonopolist is risk neutral. The problern now can be formally expresed as: 
i 
••• Ifwe consider an a:bitrary and finile number of realizations for (3(O), the mathematical treatment is mOre 
complex, but the concluslOns are Ihe same. So we take the simples! case. 
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Problem 11 
subject to: 
, 
MAl( (E{l:, ),>(a-bq(t)-c(t))q(t) /c(O))) 
,~ 
q(O),q(l) 
c(1) = max{T,c(O)-~(O)q(OJ) 
Prob(~(O)~~ +O) ~ Prob(~(O) ~ ~-8)~ 'h 
q(t)~O for every tE {O,I}. 
c(O) is given, and a,b,A,¡3,7,O,T are known. 
For the stochastic case we keep assumptions (4) to (6) and we add a new one: 
8 > O; ~-8 > O 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
This assumption implies that unitary cost cannot increase over time. Note also that, at period 
O, if q(O)=O, the unitary cost remains costant and tbere is not uncertainty about future cost. That is 
why problem 11 is still apure learning by doing problem. 
Next, we define sorne notation for the optimal policy of problems 1 and 11: 
Deiuütion 1 QJ...x) is tbe optimal output in period O for problem 1 when c(O)=x. 
Definition 2 Qe<x) is the optimaI output in period O for problem 11 when c(O)=x. 
3. Effect of the multiplicative uncertainty in a given period: Marginal and Overall 
impact 
In this Section we study how does llncertainty affect to the optimal level of output in a 
concrete periodo This can be done in two different ways: a) marginal impact, given that uncetainty 
exists (given problem 11), how does a s11Ulll change in it do change the optimal output?, b) overall 
impact, what is the difference between the deterministic (problem 1) and the stochastic (problem 11) 
case. 
In the marginal impact, we must define what we mean by a small change in the uncertainty . 
Note that given any two different probability distributions for 13(0) such that they only differ on tbe 
value of 8, the one with higher O is a mean preserving spread of the other, that is, if {3 is constant, 
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the risk increases with 8. In the marginal impact we study the variation on Q.(c(O» when there is a 
variation on (J(O) in the mean preserving spread sense· .. •. The next result summarizes our findings: 
Theorem 1 
For problem II, if the sufficient condition for global optimality given in lenuna 2 holds (see 
appendix), then we can define points ó¡, ó2 and Ó3 such that: 
i) r<ó¡<ó2<ó3<a; 
ii) if c(O)E(ó3,a) or c(O)E(ó¡,ó~ then Q.(c(O» increases with 8; 
iii) if c(O)E (Ó2,Ól) then Q.(c(O» decreases with 8; 
iv) if c(O)E(r,ól ) then Q~(C(O» does not vary with 8. 
• 
The proofs for all theorems are left to the appendix. This theorem shows that the sign of the 
change in the optima! output of the first period (Q-Cc(O») when the risk (8) changes, depends on the 
initia! cost (c(O». This can be explained by the fact that the probability of reaching r in period 1 
under the optimal policy depends 00 c(0), but also, depending on tbis probability, the objective 
function to be maximized in period O takes different functional forrns··· .... 
Let us take sorne examples to iUustrate this. First, suppose that c(O) E (T,Ó¡). In this case c(O)-r 
is so small that it is optimal c(l)=r w.p.l (w.p. stands for with probability hereafter), and 
furthennore this can be done by producing in perlod O the output which maximices current profit in 
that period, this output does not depend on 8, so Q'(C(O» does not vary with 8. Now, if c(O)E (ó¡,ó;J 
then it i5 stilJ optimal c(l)=r w.p.l, but now the output which maximizes current profit in period O 
is not enough for that, so the monopolist needs to produce more than that, io fact the monopolist 
produces a quantity wbich ensures c(l)=r, aod this quantity increases as 8 ¡ncreases. In the other 
extreme, if c(O) E (ó3,a) then it is optimal c(1) > rw.p.l., that is, c(I)=c(OH3(O)q(O) w.p.l and r does 
not play any role. This means that if we replace (3) in problem II by this linear equation we have 
an equivalent problem (the sarue optima! policy and value function). It can be easily shown from 
lemma 2 in the appendix that in this equivalent problem the expected profit of period 1 ¡ncreases with 
Qe(c(O») (what is intui!ive since Qctc(O» diminishes c(l» and this increment is higher as 8 is higher. 
4 
~ ••• In a two period problem, output on the second pedod is always the same linear function of the cost for 
that period, no matter how the risk changes. In faet, it is the same function for problem 1 and ll. So, we only 
¡ook at output on the fIrst periodo 
-•••• Thls is formally presented, together with the optima! policy in lemma 2 in appendix. 
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.. 
The next theorem presents the results related to the overall impact, that is, it compares the 
optima! output of the first pedod in prob!ems 1 and U··· ... •. 
Theorem 2 
For problem 1 and n, if the sufficient condition for global optimality given in lemmas 1 and 
2 hold (see appendix) then we can define points Cl' c2, c3 and C4 such that: 
i) r<c¡<C2<C3 <c4<a; 
ii) Q,(c,)~Q,,(c,); 
iii) Q,(c,) > Q,,(cJ; 
iv) Qic,)<Q,,(c,); 
v) Qic,»Q,,(c,). 
• 
As in the marginal impact result, this theorem indicates tbat the sign of the difference betweeo 
tite optimal output in the first period io problems 1 and n, that is Qjc(O»-Q.(c(O», depends on c(O). 
In faet, although the theorem about marginal impact presents stronger results than the one about 
overall ímpact (the frrst referrs to any value for c(0) in (r,a) while the second just chooses points 
within this interval) both results seem to go in the same direction. It seems tbat Oyeran impact io this 
models can be considered as a limit case of the marginal impact with similar explanation to the one 
given for the margioal impacto 
4. ¿Do fue known properties for the deterministic model hold under multiplicative 
uncertainty? 
For problem 1, the known results in the literature are (see e.g. Fudenberg aod Tirole (1983»: 
whenever cost reduction exists, i) optima! output in every period is greater than in the miopie case 
(that in which the monopolist only maximizes current profit), ii) output increases over time, iii) in 
sorne periods the monopolist could opperate at a 10ss. Now we check out if these properties still hold 
under multiplicative uncertainty. 
4.1 Is output greater than in the miopic case? 
In a deterministic case, if present output reduces future cost, the mooopolist will produce, in 
~ •.•• , See previous foolnote. 
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a given periad, a greater outpllt than tbe one whicb maximizes current profit (miopic Olltpllt) to take 
advantage of this fact. Next result shows that this argument stil1 halds with multiplicative uncertainty. 
Theorem 3 
For problem 11, if the sufficient condition for global aptimality given in lemma 2 holds, and 
c(O)> (2br+(¡3-0)a)(2b+¡3-0yl, then Q.(e(O» is greater than in the miopic case. 
• 
In this theorem, we exc1ude the case where e(O):$;(2br+(¡3-8)a)(2b+¡3-0rl because in this case 
c(O) is close enough to r so as to have c(l)=r w.p.l with the miopic output in the fust periodo A 
similar case OCCUIS in tbe deterministic problem (see lernma 1 in appendix), so this makes no 
difference between a determinist and a multiplicative uncertainty problem. 
4.2 Does output increases over time? 
To answer this question we need a madel where cost reduction takes several periods. To do 
that, we extend problem 11 to a case where time horizon takes an arbitrary and fmite vallle, say T, 
so periods go from O to T-l, and also c(t+ l)=max{r,c(t)-¡3(t)q(t)} for t=O, ... ,T-l where {.i3(t)}~~ 
1s a seqllence of random variables i. Ld. such that Prob(¡3(t) =13 +0) =Prob(¡3(t) = ,i3-8)= lh. In lenuna 
4 in appendix we identify, for tbis problem, when c(T-l) > r w.p.l under!he optimal poliey, and we 
a1so present the optimal poliey in this case. We use this optimal policy to study this question. In arder 
to eannect results in previous section to the ones given here, we must note that in the T period 
problem we identify the optimal policy for the biggest possible values of e(O) (see lemma 4 in 
appendix), which are those that, in the two period problem (previous sections) have optimal output 
in period O increasing with 8 and greater in the stochastic than in the deterministic case. 
Furthermore, under multiplicative uncertainty, the output in every period is a random 
variable, so we need to define what we mean by increasing output over time. This is done in the next 
definition. 
Definition 3 For problfml 11 with time horizon T, output is increasing in period t+ 1 if and only if: 
,q 
E{q;(t+ I)/q;(t),c(t)} >q;(t) 
where qe"(t) denotes optimal output in period t. Also, output is decreasing in period t+ 1 if the reverse 
holds with stricte inequality. 
Next notat10n 1S used later in the theorem. Let: 
8 
9 
K(T,O) = O 
_ t+1 ")+ (1+2A,i3K(t+l,0)i t O T 1 
K(t,O) - AK( ,0 4b-4AW+0')K(t+I,0) = "'" -
(10) 
The sequence defmed aboye has a simple interpretation. Let us consider problem 11 with time 
horizon T, and such that there is enough difference between c(O) and ., so as to have 
c(T-l»r w.p.l under the optimal policy (in lemma 4 in appendix it is fonnally presented what 
enough difference is). If in period t we have tbe unitary cost c(t), then the expected dlscounted profit 
flow from t to T-l (value function in period t) 1S K(t)(a-c(t»2, for t=O, ... ,T-l. 
The results concerning increasiog output over time are presented in the next theorem. 
Theorem 4 
Consider problem 11 witb time horizon T, and such that botb the global optimality condition 
and fue sufficient condition to have c(T-l» r w.p.l under the optimal policy, which are specified in 
lemma 4 in appendix, bold. For any tE {O, ... ,T~2} satisfying: 
1+2A'ffK(t+2,0) > [I_ AO'] .(t+I,O) 
2b-2A'(ff'+0')K(t+2,0)+ff(1 A) 4b' 
(11) 
tbe output is decreasing io pedod t+ 1. 
• 
In lemma 3 in appendix we consider problem I (deterministic ease) with time borizoo T aod 
cost evolutiongiven by c(t+ l)=max{."e(t)~¡3q(t)} for t=O, ... ,T~l. We identify wheo c(T~l».,under 
the optima! policy and we present it in this case. As we see there, the sequenee K(t,O) for t=O,. ",T-l, 
defined in (10) taking 8=0, is used to construc the optimal paliey for that problem. Since for the 
deterministic case the optimal output is always increasing, we must have tbat tbat (11) never holds 
for 8=0. In effect, note that both sides in tbe inequality in (11) become equal if 0=0·······. 
•••• '.X Since (11) is only sufficient for decreasing output, this argument just shows that our findings .are 
conformable wilh ¡he known properties for deterministic models rather than being a proof of these propertles. 
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Furthennore, (11) holds when (3-8 is small and A"" 1 ~""". Since, by hypothesis, 
8E(O.{3). when (3-8 is small we have a big risk in the probability distribution of P(/). furthermore 
A"" 1 means that future periods are very important in current periodo In a detenninistie case, the 
output is increasing over time since. in any two consecutive periods with cost reduction, the present 
output reduces future cost. and in the later period the cost is lower. With multiplicative uncertainty, 
the cost in the later period still cou1d be smaller, but also, in every period, the variance of the fumre 
cost conditioned on present cost and output increases with the present OUtput. This tends to diminish 
current output from a certain level of conditioned variance of the future cost on: if 8 is bigh enough 
(what means a big conditioned variance) and the ouput is increasing over time, we improve in tenns 
of the objective function by diminishing this variance; this is done by diminishing expected output 
more in periods with bigger expeeted output, and this 1eads to deereasing outpuf······-. 
4.3 When do the monopolist opperate at a loss? 
There is an argument in the literature to justify that the rnonopolist might opperate at a 10ss 
in sorne periods in a deterministie model (e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988»: srnce the monopolist will 
deviate from miopie output to take advantage of the cost reduction, there might be a 10ss in the 
current periodo However, in the literature it is not specified when a current 10ss takes place. So, we 
must first be able to specify when, both in the deterministic and the stochastic problem, the 
monopolist will have a current 10ss, and tben to compare the results. We work with problems 1 and 
II with time horizon T as defined in Section 4.2 becuase it allows to study how losses (if exist) are 
distributed over time when the cost reduction takes several periods. 
Fust, we consider the detenninistic problem. The next result indicates a sufficient condition 
for the monopolist to opperate at a 10ss in a given periodo 
Theorem 5 
Consider problem 1 with time horizon T, and such that both the global optimality condition 
•••••••• As anexampl~lif (T,X,(3,e,c(O), r,a,b) =(3,0.99.1,0.99,4, 1,5,8) then the optimal policy forproblem 
n is given by lemma 4 rutd (11) holds for t=O, that ¡s, output decreases in period 1 aceording to OllI definition. 
Also, if we set b=9 and keep the other parameter values then the optimal poliey is also given by Jemma 4, and 
the output is still decreasing al t=O (see necesary and suffieient eondition given in the proof of the latter 
tbeorem) although (11) does not ¡onger hold. This emphasizes thal (11) is only sufficient. 
••••• _ •• This does no! occur for any value of Ihe variance of the future COSI since, from theorem 2, when 
c(l» 1 w.p.l in problem II we have a bigger output than in problem 1 when c(l» 1. This ambiguous role 
of that varianee (when small it just inereases output, and when big il also changes sorne qualities of the output 
path) is due to the fae! Iha! the monopolist is assumed to be risk neutral. 
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-
and the sufficient condition to have c(T-l) > r under the optimal policy. whieh are specified in lemma 
3 in appendix, hold. Given any period tE {O •... ,T-l}. the monopolist opperates at a loss in that period 
when: 
if 1-(I-A)2b(X{3)·1 > O; or: 
if 1-(1-A)2b(Am-'<O. 
wherej=T-t. 
(12) 
(13) 
• 
If A=1 assumption (12) becomes (1 +(3(2b)·ly> 1 +b({3+b)"l. which always holds fur j big 
enough. This means that when A=l and there is enough differenee between c(O) and r, the 
monopolist opperates at a 10ss in the first periodo Furthennore, for any A~O, the hypothesis holds 
more easily as b gets smaller in terms of A and (3. 
When neither (12) nor (13) hold. this result says nothing, since it on1y gives a sufficient 
condition. So, the question which remains is: when b is big enough in tenns of A and {3 (neither (12) 
nor (13) hold), does the monopolist opperate at a 10ss? The next result gives an answer. It shows that, 
precisely when b is big enough in terms of A and (3, the monopolist will never opperate at a 10ss, no 
matters how big the difference between c(0) and r is (if c(O)-'T is big enough so as not to reaeh r in 
T periods). 
TIteorem 6 
Consider problem 1 with time horizon T, and such that both the global optimality condition 
and the sufficient condition to have c(T-l) > r under the optimal policy, which are specified in lemma 
3 in appendix. hold. If: 
the monopolist will never opperate at a 10ss. 
11 
b 
]-A < b+~ (14) 
• 
As we have previously indicated, (14) holds when b is big enough in terms of A and {3. If it 
oecurs, the root is real and then 1" can be '1 h h ' 
, easl y s own t at the tirst mequality alw h Id Al ays o s. so, 
fue second inequality holds more easily as b gets bigger in tenns f' d" ('f ' , o A an ¡.J 1 lt oecurs, the left sIde 
of the inequality gets closer to 0, and the right side gets closer to 1). 
So tbeorems 5 and 6 say; first, that the monopolist apperates at a los8 in the first period when 
the sJape of the inverse demand function (b) is small enough m' t f th d' enns o e ¡seount parameter (A) 
and the cost reduction that a unit of output generates ({3); and secand, that the monopolist never 
oPP,erates at a 1088 when b is big enough in terms of A and {J. Now we ask how do tbings change if 
we mtroduce multiplicative uncertainty. The next two results show that, basically, the conclusion are 
the same as in the detenn· . . Th' , lrnstlC case. lS lS so even although the periods where the monopolist 
opperate at a 105S are not exactly the 5arue for a detenninistc and a stocha5tic problem. 
As in the deterministic case, first we give a condition under which the monopolist opperates 
at a 105S in period t. This is done in the next theorem. 
Theorem 7 
Consider problem II with time horizon T, and such that both the global optirnality condition 
and the sufficient condition to have c(T-I»T w.p.l under the optimal poliey, which are specified in 
lemma 4 in appendix hold Given an . d tE {O T} , 
,. y peno , ... , -1 , the monopohst opperates at a loss in 
that perlod when: 
if 1-(l-}.,)2b(}..¡S)"1 > O; oc: 
if 1-(1-A)2d(A#yI <O, 
') 
where j = tt. 
N(l.L; < 
2b 
(15) 
(16) 
• 
Now, we present a sufficient condition under which the monopolist never opperates at a loss. 
Theorem 8 
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Consider problem 11 with time horizon T, and sueh that both the global optímality condítion 
and the sufficient eondition to have c(T-l) > r w.p.l under the optimal poliey, wruch are specified in 
lemma 4 in appendix, hold. If: 
b (17) 
2A(#(b.#)+8')) 
..!. < I-A [b- b'-~(fJ(2b.m+8') 
4b 2A(#'+(I-A)8') l-A 2(#'(1-A)8')) 
< 
the monopolist never opperates at a 10ss. 
• 
Note tbe analogy between theorem 5 and 6 and theorem 7 and 8. This suggests, as we have 
indicated, that the monopolist opperates at a 10ss under similar conditions in the detenninistic and in 
the stochastic case. 
6. Conclusions and further research 
The firms of an infant industry (Stokey (1986» have reductions in their production cost over 
time beeause they accumulate experience. This is known as learning by doing, and it has been 
extensively studied in detenninistic models. We ask if the known properties of the behaviour of finns 
with learning by doing in a detennínistic model hold when sorne uncertaínty is introduced in the cost 
reduction process. 
A discrete time and fmite time horizon model is considered, in which a monopolist, who faces 
no entry and opperates in a market with linear demand, maximizes current and discounted future 
profits. We take as starting point a deterministic cost reduction as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988): 
c(t+ l)=max{r,c(t)-¡3q(t)}, where q(t) and c(t) are, respectively, output and unitary cost in period t, 
and introduce multiplicative uncertainty in the later equation by setting c(t+ 1) =max{T,C(t)-¡3(t)q(t)} , 
where {¡S(t)} is a Li.d. sequence of random variables with known probability distribution. An 
interesting fact of tbis fonn of uncertainty is that the model is still a learning by doing model: 
Prob(c(t+ 1)< c(t)Ic(t),q(t» > OonIy ifq(t) >0, alsoProb(c(t+ 1» c(t)Ic(t),q(t»=O. Whenuncertainty 
is introduced, the monopolist is assumed to be risk neutral. 
Our analysis has two parts. In the first parto we study the influence of the multiplicative 
uncertainty on the optimaI output in a given periodo In the second part, we study if the known 
properties of tbe optimal output's path of tbe detenninistic model hold under uncertainty. 
We have analytical results showing that: 1) conceming the first part, to introduce uncertaínty, 
or to alter it in a mean preserving spread sense, ehanges the leve! of output, and the sign of this 
13 
change depends on the initial cost; 2) concerning the second part, not all of the known properties for 
a deterministic model hold under uncertainty, as we show in the next tableo 
deterministic current oulput output monopolist monopolist never 
properties greater than the increases over opperates at a opperates at a 
one which time loss in the ¡nitial 10ss when b big in 
maximizes periods when b terms of A and f3 
current profit small in tenns of 
A and {3 
multiplicative holds does not hold holds writting: holds writting: 
uncertainty when b small ... A, {3 and O. ... A, {J and O • 
properties in tenns of A and , 
notes: b is the slope ofthe inverse demand function, A is the discount parameter, and () is the stan:iard 
deviation of (3(t). AIso, in the multiplicative uncertainty case, {3 is the mean of (l(t). 
We think of two possible interesting ways to continue this work. Pirst, to consider different 
kinds of industrial structures, with special emphasis on duopoly and a case where the probability 
distribution of the perturbation «(3(t» is different for every firmo It it a well known property for a 
detenninistic roodel than asirnetries in a dupoly (Le. different initial costs) within a detenninistic 
scheme can lead to a monopoly. and we contd ask if this is still true when the differences are 
introduced only in fue perturbation teno. Second. to consider otber cases of uncertainty, specialIy a 
case where there are unknown parameters in the distribution of probability of ¡J(t). If this is so, there 
are two kinds of learning: aue about an unkown parameter, and ane retlecting the cost reduction 
irself. The key question i8: How do they interact? 
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APPENDIX 
The next two lernmas give the optimal poliey for problems 1 and 11 respectively. For the 
proof of these lemmas see Alvarez and Cerdá (1997a) and (1997b). Previously sorne notation is 
introduced. Let: 
g(x,y) 
Lemma 1 
Por problem J, if b> A(32K then: 
[~d.,(a_C(O)) Q,(c(O)) ~ ~(C(O)-T) 
~d/a-c(O)) 
K~ ~ 
4b 
T+«(3+y)xa 
l+@+y)x 
if g(rpd,l'0) < e(O) 
if g(~d."O) < c(O) '" g(~d."O) 
if c(O) '" g(~",O) 
where rpd 1 =(1 +2'A{3K)/(2b-2'Af32K), ~d.2=(2b)-I, and K and g(x,y) are defined as aboye. 
Lernma 2 
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• 
For problem n, if b> ""J\({32+02)K then: 
<I>',I(a-e(O)) if g( <1> ',1 ,O) < c(O) 
1 if 8(<1>",,0) < e(O) S g(<I>"I'0) _(e(0)-7) {3+0 
Q,(e(O)) <1> ",(a -e(O)) if g(<I>",,-O) < c(O) s g(<I>""O) 
_1_(e(0)-7) 
{3-0 if 8(<1>,,,,-0) < e(O) s g(<I>"" -O) 
<I>,,,(a-e(O» if e(O) s g( <1> ,,,, -O) 
where <1>,,1 ~(I +2A{3K)/(2b-2A({3'+O')K), <I>",~(I +2A({3-0)K)/(2b-2A({3-8)')K), 
tP~,3=(2b)-l, and K and g(x,y) are defined as before, 
Proof of theorem 1 
• 
We defme o¡=g(q,e.3'-0), 02=g(cf>e,2'-O) and 03=g(q,e,¡'0), with g(x,y) defmed as before. The 
part i follows from the faet that 7<a and so g(x,y) is and increasing function in each argument, and 
we have q,e,3 <q,e.2 < q,e,l' Now, since the hypothesis given in Iemma 2 hold, Q.(c(O» is given by that 
leruma, Next we show ji), First, e(0)E(ó"a)<>e(0»g(<I>,,1,8) and then Q,(c(O»~<I>"I(a-c(O», also 
acf>.,l/aO=4A.8Kq,e.N1 +2""J\{3K)'1 (where aflaO denotes partial derivative of frespect tú 8), so we have 
acf> • ./é)o>O, and so Q.(c(O» increases with 8 inthis case, Second, 
c(O) E (O¡,02)**g(q,e,l'-O) < c(O) < g(tPe.2'-O) and then Q.(C(O» = (,8-0),I(C(O)-7), sinee (,8-8tl increases with 
8 also does Qe(c(O». Tú proove in note that c(O)E(02,Ó:I)#c(O)E(g(q,.,l,-0),g(cf>e,¡,0» and then 
Q.(c(O»=(,8+0Yl(C(O)-7) or Qic(O»=cf>.ia-c(O»; the first expresion in strietly decreasing in O, the 
seeond also ¡s, since: éJr¡, •. iaO=-)..K(2(b+{3-0)+""J\({3-OYK)(2b-""J\(fJ-O)2K)'2, and so aq,e,iaO<O and, in 
any case, Q.(c(O» decreases with O, hence iii holds. To show iv, note that 
c(O)E(7,Ó¡)#C(O)$;g(q,.,3'-O), then Q.(c(O»=q,e,l(a-c(O» and rPe,3 does no depend on O, and so iv 
holds. 
• 
Proof of theorem 2 l 
The proofhas two step!. In the first step, we take Cl E (7,g(q, •. 3'-0» and c4 E (7,g(q,.,I'O», and we show 
that these values verify ii and v and also 7< cl < c4 < a. In the seeond step, we show that there exist 
values e2 and c3 which verify iii, iv and g(!f¡e,3,~O)<Cl<C4<g(q,.,]>o) (and so i holds), 
First step. From definitions for g(X,y), cJ>e.], and q,,¡,2 we have: 
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J 
j 
1 
J 
g(q,e,3'-0) <g(q,,¡.2,O), henee, if e¡ <g(q,'.3'-0) then Q.tCel)=q,d.2(a-C¡) and Qe(e¡)=cJ>.,l(a-cl) follow from 
lemmas 1 and 2, but it also follows: q,d,2=q, •. J' and so ji holds. AIso, from definitions of g(x,y), q,.,¡ 
and q,,¡,l we have: g(q,e,I'O) > g(cJ>,¡,¡,O), hence if e4> g(q,.,¡,8) then from Ienunas 1 and 2: 
Q,I,c4)=q,,¡,¡(a-cJ and Q.(c4)=rPe,l(a-e4). Moreover, from definitions of cf>d,l and q,e,¡ we have: 
tPd,¡<q,e,¡' and so v holds. Furthennore, sinceg(x,y) is inereasing in lts arguments and q,.,3 < rPe,¡ we 
have 7<C¡ <c4 <a. 
Second step. To proove in note that either it oecurS a) g(rPd,2>O)S,g(cf>e,2,-8), or b) 
g(q,'¡.2'O) > g(rPe,2'-0). If a) oceurs then, it exists clE [g(cf>,¡,2,O),g(q,e,2'-O)] such tha!: Qj,c.J={3'I(C2-7) 
and Q.( cl ) = ({J-ot¡ (e¡-7), hence Qe( el) > Qj Cl), Ifb) occurs, then it exists Cl E (g( q, e,2' -O) ,g( rP '¡,l' O» such 
that: Q/..cl)=rPd,2(a-cl) and Q/.cl)=q,.ia-cJ, and sinee q,,¡,2<cf> •. l we have Qi..el) > Q.tCc.J. To prove 
IV note that either it oeurrs e) g(q,d,I'O) $;g(cf>.,2,8), or d) g(q,,¡,I'O) > g(cf>e.2'O). If e) occurs then it exits 
e]E(g(cf>,¡,I,O),g(q,e.2'O» such C3 is greater than anyel choosen previously. and furthennore, from 
lemmas 1 and 2, c3 verifies: Q/..el)=q,d,¡(a-c3) and Q,,(el )=rP.,2(a-e,J. and from definitions of q,,¡,¡ and 
q,.,2 we have: cJ>,¡,¡>q,e,2 and hence Q.(c3) < QJ..c]). If d) oecurs then it exists cJ E[g(q,.,2,O),g(cf>d,¡'O)] 
sueh that el is greater that any el previously choosen, and furthermore, from lemmas 1 and 2, eJ 
verifies: Qj,cJ)={3'I(cJ-r) and Q.(e3)=((3+0t1(e3-7), hence Q.(eJ) <Q'/"c]). Finally, note that e2 and e3 
always satisfy Cl < e3. Moreover C2 ~ min{g(q,d,2'O) ,g(cJ>.,2'-0)} > g(cf>.,3 ,-O) and 
c,smin{g(~',I,O),g(~",,8)} > g(~,,1,8), 
Proof of theorem 3 
Let qm be miopic output in the first period, we have qm=(2b)'I(a-c(O». Suppose that 
Q.(c(O»=cJ>.,I(a-c(O», sinee q,e,l > (2b),1 we have Qic(O» > qm' Analogously, if 
Qe(c(O»=rPe,2(a-c(O», sinee q,e,2> (2bt¡ we have Q.(e(O»>qm' Now, if 
o.(e(O) ~(P+O)"'(e(0)-7), then: Q,(c(O» > qm<>(P +8)"'(e(0)-7) > (26)"'(a-e(0»<> 
e(O»'Ya+(1-'Y)7, where 'Y=(¡3+0)(2b+O+,8)'I. The lowest value of c(O) sueh that 
Q,(c(O))~({3+8)"I(C(O)-T) is: (T+({3+8)~."a)(1 +(P+8)~",}', henee, Q,(e(O» >qm if 
• 
(7+ (,6 + O)q, .,2a )(1 + (,8 + O)q, .,2)'1 ~ 'Ya + (1--Y)7 holds, Both sides of the later inequality are convex linear 
eombinations of a and 7, and sinee a> 7, the inequality holds if and only if 
(1 +({3+0)q,e,J'¡ $; l--y, or rPe,2~(2b)'¡, whieh is true. If Q.(c(O»=({3-0)'I(C(O)-7), then: 
Q,(e(O» > qm<>({3-8)"'(C(0)-7) > (26)"'(a-e(0»<>e(0) > ua+(I-u)T where u~(P-8)(26-8+ {3)"', But 
Q,(e(0))~({3-0)"I(e(0)-T) only if c(0»(T+({3-O)~."a)(1+(jl-8)~.,,)·I, henee, Q,(c(O))>q" if: 
(7+(¡3-0)q,e.3a)(1+«(3-0)cf>e)-120-a+(1-a)7. Both sides of the later inequality are eonvex linear 
eombinations of a and 7, and sinee a> 7, the inequality holds if only if: 
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• 
The next two lenunas give the aptimal paliey for problems 1 and II respectively, with time 
horizon T and cost evolution given by c(t+ l)=max{T,c(t)-,6q(t)} for problem 1 and 
c(t+ 1)=max{r,c(tH3(t)q(t)} for problem JI. For the proof of these lemmas see Alvarez and Cerdá 
(1997a) and (1997b). Previously sorne notation is introduced. Let: 
"(t") - 1 +2}..fjK(t+ 1,8) t O T 1 
• ,u - 2b-2J..(fl'+0')K(t+l,0) = , ... , -
R(T-l,O) = T 
R(t O) = R(t+I,O)+~.(t,O)a t = O,. . .,T-2 
, I+~W,O) 
with K(t,(J) as defined in (10), 
Lemma 3 
For problem 1 with time horizon T, ifb> )..¡32K(t+ 1,0) foe tE {O, ... ,T-l} (global optima1ity 
condition) and c(O»R(O,O) hold, then the aptimal Qutput in perlad t is q,(t,O)(a-c(t» for 
tE{O •... ,T-l}. and also c(T-l»Tunderthe optimal paliey. 
• 
Lemma4 
For problem II with time horizon r, if b> A(¡32 + fP)K(t + 1,0) for tE{O, ... ,T-l} (global 
optimality condition) and eCO) > R(O,O) hold, then the optimal output in period t is if>(t,O)(a-e(t» for 
tE {O" .. ,T-l}, and also e(T-l»., w.p.l under the optimal policy, 
• 
The condition c(O»R(O,O) ensures c(T-l»'T w.p.l under the optimal policy (and so does 
c(O»R(O,O) for the deterministic case). 
Proof of theorem 4 
If the condition~'in lemma 4 hold then the optimal policy for problem 11 is given by tbat 
lemma. Taking expectadons, and notting tbat 1 +/31>(t,(1»O, we have: 
E{q(t+ I)/q(t),e(t)} >q(t) ... (t,O)(1 +~.(t,O»)" < .(t+ 1,0). Furthennore: 
.(t,O)(1 +M(t,O»)" ~(1 +2J..~K(t+ I,O»(2b+~-2J..0'K(t+ 1,0»)" ~(1 +2J..~(}.K(t+2,0)+ 
Y,(1 +2J..~K(t+2,0».(t+ I,O»)(2b+~-2M'(}.K(t+2,0)+ Y,(I +2J..~K(t+2,0».(t+ 1,0)))-', 
where the first equaJ1ity follows from the expression for 1>(O,t) and the second from the expression 
for K(O,t). Then, we have: E{q(t+ I)/q(t),c(t)} >q(t) .. (1 +2J..~(}.K(t+2,0)+ 
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Y,(1 +2~K(t+2,0».(t+ 1,0»)(2b+~-2M'(}.K(t+2,0)+ Y,(I +2~K(t+2,0»).(t+ 1 ,O»)" < 
1>(t+ 1,0). We can rewrite the right hand side of the later implicatíon as: 
(1 +2~(}.K(t+2,0)+ 'h(1 +2MK(t+2,0».(t+ 1,0»)(2b+~-2M'(}.K(t+2,0)+ 
Y,(I +2~K(t+2,0»~(t+ 1,0»)" <~(t+ 1,0)" 
1 +2J..'~K(t+2,0)+ J..~W+ 1,0)+2}.'~'K(t+2,0).(t+ 1,0) < 
(2b+~-2J..'0'K(t+ 2,0».(t+ 1 ,O)-M'(I + 2J..~K(t+ 2,0».p(t+ 1 ,O)'" 
1 +2J..'~K(t+2,0) < (2b-2J..'(~'+O')K(t+2,0)+~(H»).(t+ 1,0)-M'(1 +2J..~K(t+2,0».(t+ 1,0)'<> 
(1 + 2J..'~K(t+ 2,0»(2b-2J..'(fJ'+ O')K(t+ 2,0) +P(I-J..))" < 
.(t+ 1,0)-M'(1 +2J..~K(t+2,O»(2b-2J..'(~'+O')K(t+2,0)+~(1-J..)Y'~(t+ 1,0)'. So, we can write: 
E{ q(t+ I)/q(t),e(t)} > q(t)"(1 + 2J..'~K(t+ 2,0»(2b-2J..'W+O')K(t+ 2,0) +~(1-A»)" < 
(I-M'.(t+ 1 ,0)(1 + 2J..~K(t+ 2,0»(2b-2J..'(fl' +tI')K(t+ 2,0)+ ~(1-J..),').(t+ 1 ,O). 
So if the inequallíty on the right hand sirle of the later implication does not hold, we have decreasing 
output in t+ 1. Now we show that (11) is a sufficient condítion for this to occur. In effect: 
(4b')" ~(2b)"(2b)" < (1 + 2A~K(t+ 2,0»(2b-2J..'(fJ'+0')K(t+2,0)+~(1-J..»)"~(t+ 1 ,O), 
sinee: (2b)" <(1 +2A~K(t+2,0»(2b-2A'(fJ'+O')K(t+2,0)+~(1-J..»)"; y (2b)" <.p(t+ 1,1i), 
hence, the right hand side in (11) ís greater than the right hand side of the ínequallity on the right side 
of the later implicatíon. 
• 
Next result is used in the following proofs. It gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
monopolist to opperate at a 10ss in a given period, within a T period problem, It can be applied for 
both the stochastic and the deterministic case. 
Lenuna 5 
For problem 11 with time horizon T as defined before and such that the opUmal poliey is 
given by lemma 4, the monopolist opperates at a loss in period t if and only if: 
K(t+I,O) > b 
2J..(~(b+~)+0') 
(22) 
This eondition also stands for the detenrunistic ease (problem 1 with time horizon T and optimal 
policy given by lemma 3) by setting 8=0. 
• 
Proof of Lemma 5 
We make the proof for the stochastie case, the deterministic case is similar. From the optimal 
policy given by lemma 2 we have: p(t)<c(t)#a~b1>(t,(J)(a-c(t»<c(t); and this can be rewriten as: 
19 
p(t) <c(t)#4»(t,8) >b-1. Now, by considering the value for 4»(t,8), we have the hypothesis given in this 
1emma. 
• 
Proof of theorem 5 
Let the difference equation x(i+1)=z(x(¡), for every j=O,l,.. with x(O)=O; where 
z(x)=Ax+(l +2}..(3X)2(4b-4}..(32xt1 for every xE {R:4b > 4}..f32x} " Note that x(i)=K(T-i,O). The proof 
is as follows: from lemma S, tbe monopolist will opperate at a 10ss in period T-j-l if and only if 
K(T-j,O), that is x(¡), is greater a certain critical value; to iderrtify a period T-j+ 1 where this occurs, 
we find a linear difference equation, say y(i+ 1)= g(y(i», satisfying: i) x(¡)~y(i) for every i=O,l, ... , 
and ii) the hypothesis of the theorem is sufficient for y(¡) to be greater than the critical value given 
in Lennna 5. 
Letg(x)~(4b)' H(1 +~(2b)')x for every xE {1II:4b>4Nl'x}. Note that z(x)>:g(x). We show, 
by finite induction on i, that the sequence given by y(i+ l)=g(y(I)) for every i=O,l, ... with y(i)=O 
satisfies x(i)~y(i) for every ;=0,1, ... In effect for i=O later inequallity holds; now suppose it holds 
for i, that is x(i)2.y(l), then x(i+l)~y(i+l) since z(x)~g(x) for every x in the domain, and so: 
x(i + 1) =z(x(i) ~g(x(i)) > g(y(i»=y(i + 1); where later inequallity follows from the fact that g is an 
increasing function. 
Now we show that the hypothesis of the theorem is suffident for y(¡) to be greater than the 
critical value given in lemma 5. The particular solution to the linear equation 
y(i+ l)=g(y(i» is y(l)=(4b(1-}")-2}..,B)"1(1-}..i(1 +{3(2b)"ly). Hence, y(¡) is greater than the critical value 
given by lemma 5 if: b(2}..,8(b+,8),1 < (4b(I-}")-2)...8)"1(1-N(1+f3(2b)"lj)" Later inequa11ity can be 
rewriten as:-b(b+f3)"1 >(1-(1-"A)2b(}..(3)"1)"1(1-N(1 +,8(2b)"ly); and depending on the sign of 
1 _(1_}")2b(}..{3)"1 we get the hypothesis of the theorem. 
• 
¡ 
Proof of tbeorem 6 :V 
Let the differencJ equation x(i+ l)=z(x(i», for every i=O,l, ... be defined as in the proof of 
theorem 5. From lemma 5, the monopolist will never opperate at a 10ss if xCi) remains lower than 
the critical value given in that lenuna for any i=O,l, ... We show, in two steps, that the hypothesis of 
the theorem is sufficient for tbat. 
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r First step. We show that if the hypothesis holds, then there is a value, say X1, sucb that it is 
a solution to the equation: x=z(x) and also z(0)<x1 <b(2}..,8(b+.8)"1 (later term 18 the critical value 
given in lenuna 5). We also proove tbat Z is an increasing function. In effect, tbe two possible 
solutions to x=z(x) are: 
x' = 1-).[b<' b'-l:fl...(2b+P) 1-
2
1
R 2Nl' 1-), e 
(23) 
Since z(0)=(4b)"1; z(O) <x~ < b(2)...8(b+{3)YI becomes the hypothesys of the theorem by multipliying 
by 2}",8 and by taking as x· the lowest possible solution to x=z(x). Moreover: 
z'(x) = A +4}..,8(1 + 2}..f3x)(4b+,8-2}..{32X)(4b-4}..fj2X)"2, (where prime denotes derivatives) and so z'(x) > O 
for any x in the domain of z. 
Second step. We show that if x' is a solution to x=z(x), such that z(O) <x· <b(2}..,8(b+,8»"¡, 
then: x(i)<x~ and so xCi) <b(2A{3(b+.8)"1 for any i~O. In effect: for i=O it holds. Let x(i)<x' hold 
for i, thenx(i+ l)=z(x(i» <z(x)=x', where the inequality follows from the fact thatz 1s an increasing 
function. 
• 
Proof of theorem 7 
Let the difference equation x(i+ l)=m(x(i», for every i=O,l, ... with x(O) =0; where 
m(x)=Ax+(1 +2A,8;tf(4b-4}..(f32+(J2)X)"1 for every xE {m.:4b>4}..(f32+(j2)x}. Note thatm(i)=K(T-i,O). 
The proof is similar to tbeorem 5: the monopolist opperates at a 10ss in period T-j-l if and only if 
K(T -j ,8), tbat 1s xV), is greater than the critical value given in lemma S, to identify a period T -j+ 1 
where this Qccurs, we find a linear difference equation, say y(i+ l)=g(y(i», satisfying: i) x(i):;;;y(i) 
for every i =0, 1, ... , and ji) the hypothesis of the theorem is sufficient for y(¡) to be greater than the 
critical value given in lemma 5. 
Let g(x)=(4b)"1 +}..(l +,8(2byl)x, for every xE {1It:4b>4A<,82+(2)x}. For tbis linear difference 
equation, we have, in a similar way to the proof oftheorem 5, that x(i);:;:';y(i) for every i=O,l, .. 
is satisfled. AIso, the particular solution to this equation is: y(i)=(4b(l M "A)-2A{3)"1(1-}..i(1 +,6(2b)"I)'). 
Hence, y(¡) is greater tban the critical value given by lemma 5 if: 
b(2}..(,8(b+{3)+82»"1 :::::;(4b(1-A)-2)...8yl(1-N(1 +{3(2b)"I)'), and from last inequality, depending on the 
sign of 1-(1-}")2b(}..,8)"I, we have the hypothesis of the theorem. 
• 
Proof of tbeorem 8 
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Let the difference equation x(i+l)=m(x(i», for every i=O,l, ... be defined as in the proof 
of tbeorem 7. From lemma S, the monopolist never opperates at a loss if xCi) is lower than the 
critica! value given in that lernma for any i=O,l, ... We show, in two steps, in a similar way to the 
proof of theorem 6, that the hypothesis of the theorem is sufficient for that. 
Pirst step. We show that if the hypothesis holds then it exists x- such that x' =m(x) and a180 
meO) <x' < b(2'A«(3(b+(3)+lf))'1 (Iater term is the critical value given in lemma 5). We also show that 
m is an increasing function. In effect, the two possible solutions to x=m(x) are: 
x' " 1-), [b'!' b'-~(fJ(2b+~)+8') J~ (24) 
2),(a'+(1 ),)If) 1-), 2(fJ'+(1 ),)8') 
Since m(Q)=(4b)"1; m(O) <x" < b(2'A((3(b+¡3) +82»),1 becomes the hypothesys of tbe tbeorem by 
multipliying by 2N3 and by taking as x' the lowest possible solution to x=m(x). Moreover: 
m'(x)~A+(l+2),~x)(2M(2b-),(~'+8'»+A(~'+8'»(2b-2),(~'+8')xY', and so m'(x»O lor any x in 
the dornain of m. 
Second step. We show tbat for x' given in the previous step: x(i)<x' and so 
xCi) <b(2'A«(3(b+(3)+82»'! holds for any t2:0. In effect: for i=O it holds. Let x(i) <x· hold for i, then 
x(i+l)=m(x(i»<m(x")=x', where the inequality arises because m is an increasing function. 
• 
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